

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00231 01 OF 05 181605Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00
PM-03 SP-02 L-01 NSC-05 INR-05 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
IO-06 EUR-08 /055 W
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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2788
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0231

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E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR: BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIETS ON NEW
WESTERN INITIATIVE OF APRIL 17, 1978

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON APRIL 17, US REP AND DEP REP HAD
BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV AT
SOVIET INVITATION. DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON NEW WESTERN INI-
TIATIVE. SOVIET REPS INDICATED INITIATIVE WOULD BE GIVEN
SERIOUS STUDY. THEIR CRITICISM FOCUSED ON PHASE I REQUIREMENT
FOR REDUCTION OF 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS, WHOSE ACCEPTANCE
TARASOV SAID WOULD DEFINITELY PREJUDICE EASTERN CASE AGAINST
ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS, WESTERN REQUIREMENT THAT PHASE I
REDUCTION COMMITMENTS FOR WESTERN EUROPEANS AND CANADA BE
COLLECTIVE, AND, ISSUE OF COLLECTIVE LIMITATIONS, WHERE SOVIETS
AGAIN IMPLIED THERE SHOULD BE THE SAME RULE FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS.
SOVIET REPS ALSO RAISED AVERAGE MANNING LEVEL ISSUE. SOVIETS
DID NOT RAISE ARMAMENT REDUCTION ISSUE, EITHER AS REGARDS US/
SOVIET OR WESTERN EUROPEANS, OR WESTERN REQUIREMENT THAT SOVIETS

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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00231 01 OF 05 181605Z

WITHDRAW FIVE DIVISIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. TARASOV BEGAN DISCUSSION WITH COMPLAINT ABOUT LEAKS IN
THE FRG NEWSPAPER DIE WELT AND IN REUTIRS APRIL 14 DISPATCH
FROM VIENNA WHICH HE CLAIMED GAVE FULL DETAILS OF WESTERN
INITIATIVE AND EVEN OF INITIAL SOVIET REACTION. HE STATED
THAT, IF CONTENT OF INITIATIVE WERE LEAKED TO WESTERN PRESS,

SOVIETS WOULD BE OBLIGED TO INFORM THEIR OWN PUBLIC OPINION ON CONTENT. US REPS REGRETTED LEAK. THEY SAID THEY INTENDED TO HOLD OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON THE INITIATIVE TO A MINIMUM.

3. TARASOV REQUESTED US REP TO GIVE HIS IMPRESSION OF THE PAST ROUND. US REP SAID IT HAD BEEN VERY USEFUL. ITS MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT WAS THAT THE WEST HAD PUT DOWN ITS NEW INITIATIVE. THE TIMING OF THIS ACTION HAD BEEN MADE POSSIBLE BY EAST/WEST AGREEMENT ON HOW TO EXCHANGE ADDITIONAL DATA. DISCUSSION OF THIS DATA HAD PROCEEDED IN A BUSINESSLIKE WAY.

4. US REP SAID THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ABOUT THE NEW INITIATIVE WAS THAT IT MEANT AN IMPORTANT CHANGE IN THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION BECAUSE IT INCLUDED A PROPOSAL FOR BINDING WESTERN COMMITMENTS ON THE TIMING AND AMOUNT OF WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS. THE WESTERN EUROPEANS, INCLUDING PARTICULARLY THE FRG, HAD MADE A POLITICAL DECISION IN DECIDING ON THIS MAJOR CHANGE FROM THEIR EARLIER POSITION THAT THEY WOULD UNDERTAKE NO SPECIFIC REDUCTION COMMITMENTS UNTIL AFTER INITIAL SOVIET REDUCTIONS.

5. TARASOV SAID WHAT WAS NOW PROPOSED WAS STILL NOT A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT. IT MEANT ONLY THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME PARTICIPATION OF THESE PARTICIPANTS, WHETHER SYMBOLIC OR WITH ONE SOLDIER, IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS, BUT MERELY THAT THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS, WITHOUT ANY INDICATION OF EXTENT.

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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00231 01 OF 05 181605Z

6. US REP SAID THE WESTERN PROPOSALS DID MEAN A BIG CHANGE BECAUSE, PREVIOUSLY, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT HAVE CERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER THERE WOULD IN FACT BE WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT HAVE CERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER PHASE II WOULD HAVE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. NOW, A BINDING COMMITMENT WAS BEING PROPOSED. NOW THAT THIS HAD BEEN DONE, THE CRITICAL ISSUE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE TALKS WAS HOW THE SOVIET UNION RESPONDED. IN THIS SENSE, THE WESTERN INITIATIVE WAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE THE TALKS INTO A DECISIVE PHASE. THE IMPORTANT THING NOW WAS FOR THE EAST TO RESPOND IN A WAY WHICH RELIEVED WESTERNEUROPEAN, ESPECIALLY FRG, APPREHENSIONS WHICH HAD GROWN DURING THE TALKS, AND WHICH SHOWED THESE PARTICIPANTS THAT WHEN THEY MADE A MAJOR MOVE, IT WOULD BE RESPONDED TO. ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE WOULD LEAD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER MOVEMENT ON BOTH SIDES TO RESOLVE REMAINING QUESTIONS. US REPS HAD OFTEN SPOKEN WITH SOVIET REPS ABOUT FRG CONCERNS AS A NON-NUCLEAR POWER ABOUT GOING INTO A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION, A SUPER POWER, AND GERMAN CONCERNS ABOUT BEING SINGLED OUT FOR LIMITATIONS. THESE WERE REAL CONCERNS. THE WAY THE EAST RESPONDED TO THE WESTERN INITIATIVE WOULD AFFECT THESE CONCERNS ONE WAY OR ANOTHER AND WOULD CONSEQUENTLY

HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS WENT FROM NOW ON.

7. US REP SAID HE HAD A FEW THOUGHTS ABOUT THE KIND OF EASTERN RESPONSE WHICH MIGHT ALLAY THESE CONCERNS AND GET THE VIENNA TALKS INTO A DECISIVE PHASE. FIRST, THE SOVIETS SHOULD INDICATE THEIR AGREEMENT TO PHASE I SOVIET REDUCTIONS AS PROPOSED, CONDITIONAL ON ULTIMATE AGREEMENT ON OVERALL DATA. SECOND, THE SOVIETS SHOULD AGREE THAT US ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS IN PHASE I SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE SPECIFIED US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. IN PHASE I THERE SHOULD BE NO ARMAMENT REDUCTION COMMITMENTS FOR THE WESTERN EUROPEANS AND CANADA. IF THE EAST DESIRED, THIS ISSUE, AS HAD ALREADY BEEN INDICATED IN INFORMAL SESSION OF APRIL 14, COULD BE RAISED IN PHASE II.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00231 01 OF 05 181605Z

8. TARASOV SAID THAT, UNDER THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS, THE ISSUE OF ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS FOR THE WESTERN EUROPEANS COULD BE DISCUSSED IN PHASE II BUT WOULD NOT BE SOLVED. THAT WAS EVIDENT. US REP SAID THIS WAS NOT NECESSARILY THE CASE. THE OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSION OF SUCH TOPICS IN PHASE II DEPENDED

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00231 02 OF 05 181618Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2789
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0231

ON THE IMPETUS GIVEN BY A SUCCESSFUL PHASE I AGREEMENT AND ALSO ON THE CONTENT OF ACTUAL PROPOSALS AT THE TIME.

9. US REP SAID HIS THIRD POINT WAS VERY IMPORTANT. IT RELATED TO THE DATA DISCUSSION. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD ANALYZED THE DISAGGREGATED DATA. THEIR ANALYSIS LED THEM TO BELIEVE THAT THE EAST HAD NOT INCLUDED IN ITS FIGURES ALL THE PERSONNEL WHICH THE WEST CONSIDERED ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE FOR POLAND. SOVIET REPS MIGHT CONSIDER THAT THERE WERE VALID REASONS WHICH ENTITLED WARSAW TREATY PARTICIPANTS TO LEAVE OUT CERTAIN PERSONNEL. BUT, BY THIS TIME, SOVIET REPS MUST BE AWARE OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE WAY THE WEST HAD APPLIED THE ACTIVE DUTY DEFINITION AND THE WAY IN WHICH THE EAST HAD INTERPRETED THIS DEFINITION AND WHAT GROUPS THE EAST HAD LEFT OUT.

10. US REP SUGGESTED THAT, IN THE DATA DISCUSSION IN THE NEXT ROUND, THE EAST SHOULD IDENTIFY THE CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL WHICH THEY FELT THE WARSAW PACT WAS JUSTIFIED IN NOT INCLUDING IN ITS FIGURES. SUCH AN IDENTIFICATION WOULD NOT PREVENT THE EAST FROM ARGUING THAT THESE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. THIS ACTION WOULD DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE ISSUE OF TRUST IN THE TALKS. US REP SAID HE HAD CHARACTERIZED THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00231 02 OF 05 181618Z

PRESENT SITUATION AS ONE OF DIFFERENCE IN DEFINITIONS. BUT WESTERN REPS COULD NOT ADHERE TO SUCH A LINE FOREVER AND IF THEY CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SOMETHING HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY CONCEALED, THIS WOULD BE DAMAGING FOR THE EAST. THE PRESENT EXCHANGE OF DATA AND THE OFFER BY THE WESTERN EUROPEANS AND CANADA TO MAKE A COMMITMENT ON AMOUNT AND TIME OF THEIR REDUCTIONS, MADE IT AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR THE EAST TO MAKE SUCH AN INDICATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE WEST HAD ALREADY, FOR ITS PART, ACKNOWLEDGED THE EXISTENCE OF ANOMALIES EXISTING IN ITS OWN DATA. THE DATA DISPUTE WAS THE MOST DIFFICULT AREA IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE COURSE OF THE FURTHER DATA DISCUSSION MUST DO AWAY WITH SOME OF THE SUSPICIONS WHICH HAD ARISEN. DOING THIS WOULD PLACE BOTH SIDES IN A BETTER POSITION TO GET TO AN OUTCOME.

11. TARASOV SAID HE BELIEVED THE EAST HAD INDICATED ALL THE CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL WHICH THE EAST HAD EXCLUDED FROM ITS FIGURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE TIME WHEN DEFINITIONS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. THE EAST HAD SPOKEN AT THAT TIME OF BORDER GUARDS, INTERNAL SECURITY PERSONNEL AND OTHER SIMILAR PERSONNEL. FOR THIS REASON, HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT OTHER CATEGORIES THE EAST WOULD BE EXPECTED TO INDICATE. US REP SAID, AS HE HAD INDICATED, THE PLACE WHERE IT WAS clearest TO HIM THAT PARTICIPANTS MUST BE APPLYING THE DEFINITIONS OF ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL DIFFERENTLY WAS WITH THE POLES. HERE, IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE EAST MUST HAVE APPLIED THE DEFINITIONS DIFFERENTLY FROM THE WEST. CONSEQUENTLY, HE WOULD SUGGEST THAT SOVIET REPS REVIEW THEIR FIGURES AND TALK TO

THE POLES AND SEE THAT IF IN THAT AREA THERE WASN'T A REAL
POSSIBILITY TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION.

12. TARASOV SAID WAS THE US REP SUGGESTING THAT THE EAST
SHOULD ENUMERATE ALL THE CATEGORIES WHICH THE EAST DID NOT
INCLUDE IN ITS FIGURES? PERHAPS IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE WEST
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00231 02 OF 05 181618Z

WOULD TELL THE EAST WHICH UNITS IT HAD INCLUDED IN THE WESTERN
ESTIMATES. THEN THE EAST WOULD TELL THE WEST WHETHER THEY
INCLUDED THESE FORCES OR NOT IN THEIR DATA. HE ASSUMED THAT
BOTH SIDES HAD INCLUDED MOST OF THE SAME UNITS IN ANY EVENT.
BUT IF THE WEST WOULD GIVE THE EAST A LIST OF THOSE CATEGORIES
OF UNITS THEY HAD INCLUDED, AND THOSE WHICH THE WEST THOUGHT
THE EAST DID NOT INCLUDE, THE EAST COULD RESPOND.

13. US REP SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT THIS FURTHER. BUT HIS
INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE HARD FOR THE SOVIETS
THEMSELVES TO IDENTIFY THIS BORDERLINE CATEGORY OF FORCES
WITHOUT SUCH AN EXTENSIVE PROCESS. TARASOV SAID IN PRACTICE IT
SEEMED IMPOSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIET AND OTHER MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE
WOULD GIVE THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS TAKING THE
INITIATIVE TO ENUMERATE ALL OF THE UNITS WHICH THE EAST HAD
INCLUDED IN ITS FIGURES. THIS WOULD MEAN DISCLOSING THE WHOLE
ORGANIZATION OF THE WARSAW TREATY FORCES. THIS WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE. IT WOULD BE ANOTHER THING IF THE WEST WOULD TELL
THE EAST WHAT UNITS AND FORMATIONS THE WEST HAD INCLUDED IN ITS
FIGURES ON EASTERN FORCES. IN SUCH AN EVENT, THE EAST COULD
ANSWER WHETHER THE EAST HAD INCLUDED SUCH AND SUCH UNITS,
OR, IN THE CASE OF SOME UNITS, THE EAST MIGHT SAY THEY WERE NOT
INCLUDED AND WHY. PARTICIPANTS ALREADY HAD A PRECEDENT FOR
THIS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE POLISH DIVISION PROTECTING THE SEACOAST
WHERE THE EAST HAD EXPLAINED WHY THEY HAD NOT INCLUDED THIS
PERSONNEL. PARTICIPANTS COULD THEN ARGUE WHETHER SUCH UNITS
SHOULD BE INCLUDED OR NOT. THIS WOULD MAKE THE DECISION MORE
SPECIFIC.

14. US REP SAID IT WOULD BE EASIER IF THE EAST WOULD TAKE
THE INITIATIVE TO INDICATE THE KINDS OF UNITS OR PERSONNEL OR

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00231 03 OF 05 181650Z

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SS-14 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2790

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0231

CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL WHICH IT HAD CONSIDERED BORDERLINE CASES AND THEREFORE HAD EXCLUDED. SHUSTOV SAID US REP HAD SPECIFIED THE POLES. THAT WAS ONE THING. BUT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW DIFFERENCES COULD BE FOUND IN SOVIET FORCES. TARASOV SAID WHEN THE EAST DISCUSSED WESTERN FIGURES, IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO NAME THE UNITS IT HAD INCLUDED IN ITS ESTIMATE OF WESTERN FORCES. US DEP REP SAID SOVIET REPS SHOULD THINK OVER WHAT US REP HAD PROPOSED. TARASOV RETORTED THAT HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE FRG WOULD WANT TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO ENUMERATE ALL ITS UNITS. US REP SAID AS HE SAW IT, IT WAS MORE THAN ONE OR TWO UNITS. IT WAS RATHER SOME CATEGORY OR TYPES OF FORCES WHERE THE TWO SIDES HAD DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS. NOW THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD EXCHANGED INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY NUMBERS, THE EVIDENCE FOR THIS WAS STRONG. TARASOV ASKED WHETHER US REP HAD IN MIND THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TURN TO A DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS. US REP SAID HE DID NOT OPPOSE THIS, BUT WHAT HE HAD IN MIND PRIMARILY WAS A QUESTION OF INTERNAL REVIEW BY THE EAST OF ITS OWN FIGURES. SHUSTOV SAID HE WAS NOT SURE HE HAD UNDERSTOOD THE RELATIONSHIP OF THIS PROPOSAL WITH THE SPECIFIC FIGURES. THE EAST WAS EXPECTED TO EXPLAIN WHICH CATEGORIES THEY HADN'T COUNTED. US REP SAID YES, AFTER EAST HAD REVIEWED ITS FIGURES, THEY COULD GIVE REASONS FOR NOT COUNTING CERTAIN GROUPS AND PARTICIPANTS COULD DISCUSS THESE REASONS. SHUSTOV ASKED DID US REP HAVE IN MIND THAT THE
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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00231 03 OF 05 181650Z

EAST SHOULD INDICATE THE NUMBERS ATTACHED TO THESE GROUPS?
US REP SAID HE WAS NOT PROPOSING THIS AT THE PRESENT STAGE.

15. TARASOV SAID, AS FAR AS HE COULD SEE, IT WOULD BE AN IMPRACTICAL METHOD FOR THE EAST TO PRESENT INFORMATION ON GROUPS THAT THEY CONSIDERED NOT AS PART OF THE ARMED FORCES. IF THE WEST HAD DOUBT ABOUT WHETHER THE EAST WAS INCLUDING INDIVIDUAL CATEGORIES OR TYPES OF UNITS, THEY COULD ASK AND THE EAST WOULD ANSWER WHETHER THESE WERE INCLUDED. US REP SAID HE WOULD MERELY REPEAT AT THIS POINT THE SUGGESTION THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS EXAMINE THE BORDERLINE ISSUES TO TRY TO IDENTIFY

GROUPS WHICH THE WEST MIGHT HAVE INCLUDED IN ITS FIGURES AND THE EAST HAD NOT.

16. TARASOV SAID US REP HAD MADE ANOTHER SUGGESTION, WHICH WAS THAT THE EAST SHOULD ACCEPT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS ON PHASE I SOVIET REDUCTIONS. HOW COULD EAST ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE WEST HAD USED AS A BASIS OF ITS NEW PHASE I PROPOSALS THE WESTERN THEORY OF DISPARITIES DESPITE THE FACT THAT FINAL AGREEMENT ON DATA WAS STILL LACKING. US REP SAID THIS WAS SO, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT ONE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE AN IMPROBABLY LARGE CHANGE IN THE FACTS BEFORE THE SIZE OF THESE PHASE I SOVIET REDUCTIONS BECAME ANY PROBLEM. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE SOVIETS TOOK OUT APPROXIMATELY 70,000 IN PHASE I -- 68,000 ROUNDED OFF FOR EASIER COMPUTATION--AND THE SOVIETS HAD HALF OF ALL WARSAW TREATY FORCES IN THE AREA AND TOOK HALF OF WARSAW TREATY REDUCTIONS, THE TOTAL WARSAW TREATY REDUCTION WOULD BE 140,000. IF THIS WERE ADDED TO A COMMON CEILING OF 700,000, IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE EAST WAS STARTING FROM 840,000 WARSAW TREATY FORCES. SPEAKING THEORETICALLY, THIS WOULD MEAN THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD COME TO AGREE THAT THE DISPARITY IN FAVOR OF THE WARSAW TREATY WAS 50-60,000 INSTEAD OF 150,000 WHICH THE WEST NOW CONSIDERED TO BE THE ACCURATE SECRET

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00231 03 OF 05 181650Z

FIGURE. THIS WAS NOT A PROBABLE OUTCOME; THEREFORE, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A VERY LARGE DIFFERENCE FROM THE WEST'S PRESENT FIGURES BEFORE THE PROPOSED SOVIET PHASE I FIGURE WOULD BE AT ALL AFFECTED.

17. TARASOV SAID THE EASTERN VIEW WAS THAT THERE WAS NO DISPARITY. THE WEST HAD NOT PROVEN THAT THE EAST HAD MORE PERSONNEL. THE EAST HAD PROPOSED REDUCING 20-30,000 ON EACH SIDE IN THE FIRST PHASE OF ITS FEBRUARY 1976 PROPOSAL. IF THE EAST NOW ACCEPTED A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE 68,000 SOVIET PERSONNEL VERSUS 29,000 US PERSONNEL, IT WOULD THUS BE ACCEPTING THE CONCEPT OF REDUCING ON THE BASIS OF A DISPARITY AND WOULD PREJUDICE ITS POSITION AGAINST ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. US REP SAID HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT SUCH ACCEPTANCE BE MADE CONDITIONAL ON ULTIMATE AGREEMENT ON DATA. TARASOV SAID, SPEAKING THEORETICALLY, SUPPOSE PARTICIPANTS DID AGREE THAT DISPARITIES EXISTED AND THAT THEY WERE APPROXIMATELY 40,000 OR 50,000 IN FAVOR OF THE EAST. IN SUCH A CASE, REDUCTIONS OF BOTH SIDES BY TWO TO THREE PERCENT WOULD NOT RESULT IN REDUCTION FIGURES WHICH WERE THE SAME AS THOSE WHICH THE WEST WAS NOW PROPOSING. TO TAKE ANOTHER EXAMPLE, THEORETICALLY ONE COULD ASSUME THAT THE EAST DID IN FACT HAVE 806,000 GROUND FORCES AND THE WEST 791,000. THEN ONE COULD ADD 40,000 MORE TO 806,000 AND TAKE 3 PERCENT OF BOTH FIGURES, 791,000 AND 846,000. THE REDUCTION FOR THE EAST UNDER THIS CASE WOULD BE 25,000, NOT 68,000. US REP SAID THIS ARITHMETIC WAS RIGHT, BUT I TARASOV TOOK THIS EQUAL PERCENTAGE

APPROACH AND THERE WAS A DISPARITY, THEN THERE WOULD NEVER BE AN EQUAL OUTCOME, WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE EAST WAS NOW WILLING TO AGREE TO. TARASOV SAID, WHY SHOULD THE EAST AGREE TO REDUCE 40,000 MORE THAN THE WEST IN PHASE I EVEN USING THESE THEORETICAL

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00231 04 OF 05 181642Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00
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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0231

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FIGURES. THEN THE ENTIRE DISPARITY WOULD BE ELIMINATED IN PHASE I EVEN IN THE EVENT OF A 50,000 EASTERN SUPERIORITY.

18. US REP SAID, WHY NOT DO SO, NOW THAT THE EAST HAD A BINDING COMMITMENT THAT THE WEST WOULD REDUCE TO EQUALITY. THE EAST COULD NOT BE DAMAGED BY THE FACT THAT SOVIET REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE FIRST, SINCE THE WEST WOULD NOW BE COMMITTED TO REDUCTIONS. SHUSTOV SAID THE EAST'S IDEA IN THE FEBRUARY 1976 PROPOSAL WAS THAT, IN ORDER NOT TO DAMAGE THE SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD MAKE REDUCTION OF ONLY TWO TO THREE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF EACH SIDE AND THUS OF APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AMOUNT. THEN, IN THE SECOND STAGE PARTICIPANTS WOULD TAKE THEIR REMAINING REDUCTIONS. THE SOVIETS WOULD TAKE MORE IN THE SECOND STAGE. BUT NOW, THE WEST WANTED THE SOVIETS TO TAKE IT ALL IN THE FIRST STAGE.

19. US REP REPEATED HIS POINT. TARASOV SAID THIS MIGHT
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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00231 04 OF 05 181642Z

BE SO BUT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT KNOW WHETHER THE FRG WAS REDUCING MORE THAN ONE MAN. TARASOV SAID, MOREOVER, IF THE EAST'S DATA WAS USED AND REDUCTIONS WERE MADE TO THE PROPOSED COMMON CEILING OF 700,000 FOR GROUND FORCES, THEN SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF 68,000 WOULD BE MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF TOTAL WARSAW TREATY REDUCTIONS. US DEP REP SAID THIS WOULD BE SO BUT THE EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF PHASE I REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON AGREEMENT OF DATA. IF THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT, THE EAST WOULD NOT BE BOUND. TARASOV SAID, NONETHELESS, SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE CLEARLY BASED ON THE WESTERN ASSUMPTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A DISPARITY. HOW COULD THE SOVIETS BE REASONABLY EXPECTED TO ACCEPT THIS ASSUMPTION WITHOUT PREJUDICING THEIR CASE? SHUSTOV SAID THIS WOULD BE SOMEWHAT MORE THAN A TWO-TO-ONE REDUCTION, INDICATING THAT PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THE OVERALL REDUCTION SHOULD BE OF THESE PROPORTIONS. TARASOV SAID HE HAD THOUGHT IT PROPER TO MENTION THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE, SO THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT HAVE EXCESSIVE EXPECTATIONS AS REGARDS THE EASTERN REPLY.

20. TARASOV THEN TURNED TO ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE INITIATIVE. WAS IT POSSIBLE AT LEAST IN THEORY TO SEPARATE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION REQUIREMENTS? THAT IS, COULD THERE BE INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION REQUIREMENTS BUT COLLECTIVE LIMITATIONS? THESE ISSUES DID NOT SEEM INTRINSICALLY RELATED. TO WHOM COULD THE EAST TURN IF THE REDUCTION COMMITMENT TOO WAS GOING TO BE A COLLECTIVE ONE? HOW COULD IT VERIFY WHETHER A REDUCTION HAD TAKEN PLACE? OR HOW COULD IT VERIFY WHETHER AN INCREASE HAD TAKEN PLACE, BRINGING WESTERN FORCES ABOVE A COMMON CEILING? US REP SAID, CONCEPTUALLY, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION REQUIREMENTS AND TO PROVIDE FOR INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION COMMITMENTS AND COLLECTIVE RESIDUAL LIMITATIONS. HE SAID, AS TO COMPLAINTS ABOUT COMPLIANCE, THIS WAS THE TYPE OF ISSUE WHICH MIGHT BE RAISED IN A FOLLOW-ON ORGANIZATION IN WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00231 04 OF 05 181642Z

RESPOND TO THE OTHER'S QUESTIONS. THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE IN SALT WAS AN EXAMPLE. TARASOV SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, IF FRENCH FORCES IN THE FRG WERE REDUCED AND BELGIUM SAID IT HAD NOT REDUCED ITS FORCES BECAUSE IT WAS MAKING GOOD THIS FRENCH DECREASE, HOW WOULD THE EAST KNOW THAT THE WEST WAS ADHERING TO AN AGREEMENT? US REP SAID HE SUPPOSED EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE TO GIVE THE OTHER SOME INDICATION OF WHAT HAD BEEN DONE IN THE WAY OF REDUCTIONS AFTER REDUCTIONS WERE MADE. TARASOV SAID, WHY COULDN'T ONE CONSIDER INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENTS FOR REDUCTIONS AND SEPARATE THIS ENTIRE ISSUE FROM RESIDUAL

LIMITATIONS? AS REGARDS THE LATTER, THERE WAS AFTER ALL A CLEAR POLITICAL LIMITATION ON THE CAPACITY OF THOSE OF THE PARTICIPANTS WHO HAD TROOPS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, SUCH AS THE SOVIETS OR EVEN BELGIAN TROOPS IN THE FRG, TO CHANGE THE SIZE OF THEIR FORCES EITHER UP OR DOWN. THESE POLITICAL CONDITIONS WOULD REMAIN VALID AFTER A REDUCTION AGREEMENT WAS IN EFFECT. THERE WAS NO PRACTICAL NEED FOR INDIVIDUAL LIMITATIONS. SHUSTOV SAID THERE WAS MAJOR PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIETS IN THE CONCEPT THAT OTHER PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO A COLLECTIVE CEILING AND THE SOVIETS TO INDIVIDUAL CEILINGS. THE SOVIETS COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. US REP SAID THERE WERE TWO DIFFERENT SITUATIONS HERE. THE SOVIETS WOULD ONLY BE LIMITING THEIR FORCES STATIONED IN THE AREA. US REP SAID, IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THAT THERE PROBABLY WOULD BE LITTLE CHANGE IN THE INTERNAL COMPOSITION OF WESTERN FORCES AFTER A REDUCTION AGREEMENT RESULTING IN COLLECTIVE LIMITATIONS.

21. TARASOV SAID HE BELIEVED THAT US REP WAS IN PRACTICE CONFIRMING THE SOVIET VIEW THAT IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATION THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND FRG FORCES WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND US FORCES. THIS POINT SHOULD GIVE US REPS THE KEY TO UNDERSTANDING THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE VIENNA TALKS. THE SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD, OF COURSE, THAT THE CENTER OF EUROPE WAS NOT ISOLATED FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD AND THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF WORLD PEACE, INCLUDING THAT OF EUROPE, DEPENDED FIRST OF ALL ON US/SOVIET
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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00231 04 OF 05 181642Z

RELATIONS. BUT AS FAR AS THE FORCES WITHIN THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN AREA WERE CONCERNED, THE RIGHT RELATIONSHIP WAS BETWEEN SOVIET AND FRG FORCES. US REP SAID THESE REMARKS CAUSED HIM TO STRESS ONCE AGAIN THAT THE FRG HAS EXPRESSED ITS INTEREST IN AN AGREEMENT

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00231 05 OF 05 181658Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00
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S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0231

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THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN THE INITIATIVE AND ALSO TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF AN APPROPRIATE SOVIET RESPONSE WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE SUCH PARTICIPATION. TARASOV SAID HE HAD LISTENED TO US REP'S VIEWS WITH VERY CLOSE ATTENTION AND THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD MAKE A VERY SERIOUS STUDY OF THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS. BUT THE WEST SHOULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS COULD ACCEPT THEM IN TOTO AS A BASIS OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

22. TARASOV SAID HE WISHED TO TURN TO THE MANNING LEVEL ISSUE. ON THIS POINT, HE WISHED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CLARIFYING THE EASTERN APPROACH. FIRST, THE PERCENTAGE OF THE MANNING LEVEL OF THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES WHICH EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE PREPARED TO PRESENT IN THE TALKS WOULD BE CALCULATED ON THE BASIS OF THE OVERALL TOTAL OF POSITIONS ENVISAGED BY THE TABLE OF ORGANIZATION OF FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUBUNITS IN THE REDUCTION AREA IN PEACETIME. US REP ASKED DID TARASOV MEAN ALL SOVIET
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00231 05 OF 05 181658Z

UNITS IN THE AREA? TARASOV SAID YES.

23. TARASOV SAID THAT THE SECOND POINT WAS THAT IN THE CASE OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE GDR, POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE PEACETIME TABLE OF ORGANIZATION STRENGTH FOR EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES CONSISTS OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF POSITIONS IN ALL UNITS, WHICH ARE MANNED IN PEACETIME AT LEAST BY A CADRE, AND THAT IT DOES NOT INCLUDE THE POSITIONS IN UNITS WHICH WOULD COME INTO BEING ONLY UNDER WARTIME MOBILIZATION.

24. TARASOV SAID THE THIRD PINT WAS THAT IN THE CASE OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE GDR, POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE FIGURES ON MANNING LEVELS OF THESE FORCES WHICH THE EAST WAS PREPARED TO PRESENT WOULD REPRESENT FOR EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES A PERCENTAGE OF THE OVERALL TOTAL OF POSITIONS CONTAINED IN THE TABLES OF ORGANIZATION OF ALL FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUBUNITS ESTABLISHED FOR PEACETIME.

25. TARASOV CONTINUED EASTERN REPS ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE DATA EXCHANGE ON MANNING LEVELS, NOT BECAUSE THEY WISHED TO TABLE MORE DATA AS SUCH, BUT BECAUSE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS PROCEEDED FROM THE FACT THAT ONE OF THE REASONS EXPLAINING A DIVERGENCE IN FIGURES COULD BE--HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THE PHRASE COULD BE--AN INCORRECT WESTERN IDEA OF MANNING LEVEL OF EASTERN FORCES. EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THEIR ESTIMATE OF THE STRENGTH OF THE WESTERN FORCES COULD ALSO BE BASED ON AN IMPRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR MANNING LEVEL. IF EXCHANGE OF THESE MANNING LEVEL FIGURES COULD HELP PARTICIPANTS TO MAKE THEIR ESTIMATES MORE ACCURATE, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL. IF IT DID NOT HELP PARTICIPANTS ON THIS ISSUE, THEN IT COULD BE PUT ASIDE AND DROPPED.RESOR

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